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The Curious Untidiness of Property & 
Ecosystem Services: A Hybrid Method of 
Measuring Place 
JOHN PAGE,* ANN BROWER,** AND JOHANNES WELSCH*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we look at property and ecosystem services, 
and the physicalized context in which the two converge. 
Ecosystem services (ES) are those services provided to society by 
functioning ecosystems, intact and modified; they include 
recreation, water filtration, and carbon sequestration. ES 
combine ecological and economic spheres, while property 
encompasses the political and economic. Ecosystem services, like 
property rights, are anthropocentric in nature. Each benefits 
human well-being.1 But ecosystem services do not fit neatly into 
fixed land parcel boundaries or orthodox conceptions of property. 
This leads to an untidy overlay of property rights, claims, and 
uses across the natural capital and resource flows of ecosystem 
services. 
Such untidiness could be explained by the fact that ES, while 
no longer new,2 is not yet fully developed within the law, 
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 1. “Ecosystem services are the many and varied benefits that people obtain 
from ecosystems.” DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, WATER, HERITAGE & THE ARTS, AUSTL. 
GOV’T, ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: KEY CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 8 (2010). 
 2. One of the first and broad characterizations came from Gretchen Daily, 
defining ES as “the conditions and processes through which natural ecosystem, 
and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfil human life.” GRETCHEN C. 
1
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especially so in a property framework.3  Or, it could be because 
they are fundamentally beyond comparison. Some commentators 
call for a revised “mechanism for distributing rights among the 
broad spectrum of property owners.”4 Others suggest that the 
“very nature of ES defies assigning property rights.”5  To us, this 
defiance is hard to reconcile. Both ES and property seek to assign 
value to natural resources. In this sense, ES is a propertied 
response to the bounties of nature. As such, property and ES are 
two sides of the same coin. 
Since its inception, the idea of ES has developed 
theoretically,6 intrinsically related to place. By contrast, property 
 
DAILY, NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 3 
(Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997). Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World's 
Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 254 (1997) (defines 
ES from an economic standpoint, “flows of materials, energy and information 
from natural capital stocks which combine with manufactured and human 
capital services to produce human welfare.”); see, e.g., Rudolf S. De Groot et al., 
A Typology for the Classification, Description and Valuation of Ecosystem 
Functions, Goods and Services, 41 ECOLOGICAL ECONS. 393, 396 (2002) (similar 
definitions and lists of ES have been compiled with a primarily holistic view, but 
lacking specifics to advance systems management and the benefits they 
provide). Efforts to make the concept more accessible and concrete for both 
decision makers and the public resulted in the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA). The MEA grouped ES into four groups: provisioning services 
(food, fodder, fuel, timber and water); regulating services (pest and weed control, 
climate regulation, pollination); cultural services (recreation, aesthetic, cultural 
heritage, sense of place); and supporting services (services that support and 
maintain ecosystem services). Gretchen Daily & Shamik Dasgupta, Concept of 
Ecosystem Services, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIODIVERSITY 353−62 (Simon Levin 
ed., 2d ed. 2001). 
 3. J.B. Ruhl et al., The Context of Ecosystem Services, in THE LAW & POLICY 
OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (2d ed. 2007). 
 4. Id. at 96. 
 5. Id. at 95. 
 6. Numerous international studies subsequently advanced an 
understanding of ES, particularly around their ecological dynamics. See, e.g., 
Claire Kremen et al., The Area Requirements of an Ecosystem Service: Crop 
Pollination by Native Bee Communities in California, 7 ECOLOGY LETTERS 1109 
(2004); Harpinder S. Sandhu et al., The Future of Farming: The Value of 
Ecosystem Services in Conventional and Organic Arable Land: An Experimental 
Approach, 64 ECOLOGICAL ECONS. 835 (2008). The economic value of ES to 
human communities has been suggested to be worth approximately U.S. $33 
trillion per year. Costanza et al., supra note 2, at 259. For an example of their 
geographical distribution throughout the landscape, see  Ian A. Dickie et al., 
Ecosystem Service and Biodiversity Trade-offs in Two Woody Successions, 48 J. 
APPLIED ECOLOGY 926 (2011); Claire Kremen, Managing Ecosystem Services: 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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theory is often described as devoid of place.7  But the placement 
of ES into landscapes has revealed measurement difficulties. 
Given the shortcomings of ES and property theory, we approach 
the question of untidiness empirically. We use two well-loved 
cultural landscapes on New Zealand’s South Island, the Tekapo 
Basin and Taylor’s Mistake, and use three methods of describing 
place that fall along the quantitative-qualitative spectrum. 
Theoretically, this paper builds on ideas of ES in landscapes, 
property theories of plurality and marginality, and the legal 
geography of localized place. Methodologically, we will explore 
three divergent ways of measuring ES in a propertied landscape. 
Substantively, combining property theory and spatial methods in 
this way will allow for future consideration of property 
arrangements that might be more optimal8 and representative of 
contextualized place. 
Part II presents the qualitative method—a narrative 
description of the flow of resources and services across a transect 
from the mountains to the sea. Narrative is effective in describing 
the aesthetics and indelibly human values of landscapes.  This 
sense of place is itself an ES, a cultural service.9  Part III turns to 
the state-of-the-art spatial modeling technique, Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS). GIS is Cartesian, rational, defensible, 
and replicable. It is useful for configuring and implementing all 
forms of property measurement and transaction—whether 
zoning, planning, purchasing, owning, managing, or subdividing.  
In its layers upon layers of detail, it captures the multiple 
dimensions and scales, in time and space, of ecosystems, 
landscapes, and property. 
Part IV discusses property plurality, a nascent theory based 
on an instinctive understanding of property in land outside the 
mainstream private ownership model. We use plurality as our 
third method. It draws on diverse sources: different concepts of 
mapping property, the potential of property marginality to 
 
What Do We Need to Know About Their Ecology?, 8 ECOLOGY LETTERS 468 
(2005); Ruhl et al., supra note 3. 
 7. See THE EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY 3 (Irus 
Braverman et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter EXPANDING SPACES]. 
 8. By optimal, we mean a property model that would deliver ecosystem 
services most efficiently, equitably, and effectively to communities near and far. 
 9. AUSTL. GOV’T, supra note 1, at 9. 
3
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explain the truth of our relationships with land, and the 
simplistically appealing idea that property is because it is 
performed, constantly and ceaselessly. Part V addresses three key 
questions that combine and compare the methods of describing 
the landscapes of Tekapo and Taylor’s. In Part VI, we ask what 
those combinations and comparisons mean for property and ES. 
Part VII concludes. 
The methodological comparison reveals a curiosity: the more 
rational and detached the method of representation, the less 
recognizable the landscape. Lines dissecting landscapes tend to 
distort reality.10  They risk making somewhere appear as 
anywhere. In the case of ES, the inevitability of distortion may 
still be truthful. But in the case of property, the lines go further, 
so impoverishing the diversity of propertied relationships in situ 
that these relationships are rendered invisible. Property lines not 
only distort reality, they distort the truth of place.11  Anywhere 
becomes a propertied nowhere.  Ironically, it is not the Tekapo 
Nowhere described in Part II. In the end, our criticism is not of 
GIS, but of an atomized, parceled, abstract view of property. 
Maps show gaps in property, not in maps. 
This curiosity speaks to the question of untidiness of property 
and ES in landscapes. It suggests that the explanation for the 
untidiness is neither incomparability, nor under-theorization, but 
both. The empirics of place bell the cat. This has profound 
implications for property. Disparate though they may be, 
property and ES are two sides of the same coin. This is the 
paradox we wade into. 
II. THE LIVED EXPERIENCE: THE NARRATIVE 
METHOD 
This section presents a narrative transect from the 
Mountains to the Sea of New Zealand’s South Island. It attempts 
to encompass Dagan’s “full orchestration”12 of the lived 
experience of property and ecosystem services.  In the tradition of 
 
 10. Boaventura De Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading: Toward a 
Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J. L. & SOC’Y 279, 282-86 (1987). 
 11. See id. 
 12. HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 72 (2011). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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Blomley,13 grounding the descriptive method to place crystallizes 
the interplay between ES and property, and allows us to explore 
the untidiness at the margins between the two. The transect 
reveals that though we are aware of ES only occasionally, they 
contribute much to our lives, our personal and national identity, 
aesthetic pleasure, relaxation, clean air, clean water, recreation, 
health and fitness, agriculture and productive industries, climate 
regulation, soil productivity, and so on. 
 Tekapo A.
We start the journey at the head of Lake Tekapo, just below 
the confluence of the Godley and Macauley Rivers and to the 
northwest of Tekapo Township. The craggy peaks leaning over 
the lake reveal the obvious glacial history of the basin, and 
contrast the surreal blue of the lake. Images of Narnia, Lord of 
the Rings, and fairy tales spring to mind. The blues of the lake, 
the golds of the hills, and the greys of the sometimes-angry sky 
are not soon forgotten. If you are a New Zealander, you might 
well feel that you are coming home to a place you have never 
been. As a latte-supping Aucklander or black-clad Wellingtonian, 
you have neither mustered nor sheared sheep, but the distant 
memory lives in your heart, nerve, and sinew. Though you have 
never been to this here spot, it is who you are. 
A few minutes after arriving by car, the engine will cool and 
you will slowly start to notice something that you cannot identify 
right away. It is not a presence but an absence. You soon realize 
that you are noticing silence. The absence of noise. Just nothing. 
The air is so crystalline, the water so blue, and the silence so 
profound that visitors have to take a step back to avoid being 
swallowed whole by the pure, unadulterated space. 
But the space is far from empty. Though the peaks look 
abrupt, and the sky may appear angry, the space welcomes New 
Zealanders and tourists alike. The Te Araroa Trail passes 
between the head of the lake and the Main Divide on its long and 
often arduous route from the northern apex to southern apogee of 
New Zealand. Look down the lake and you’ll see sheep and deer 
 
 13. See generally NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES 
OF POWER (1994). 
5
4_BROWER FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
2015] A HYBRID METHOD OF MEASURING PLACE 761 
 
production, and Round Hill ski field, a private alpinism 
concession serving international and domestic clients. On the 
true left of the lake, you’ll see the steep slopes of ridge after ridge 
of the Two Thumb Range, which hosts independent and guided 
trampers, hunters, and Nordic skiers who might travel up the 
seemingly never-ending Snake Ridge to traverse Stag Saddle into 
Mesopotamia Station, formerly a Crown pastoral lease and now 
largely conservation land with a lucrative exclusive hunting 
concession over much of it. These visitors, be they New 
Zealanders coming home or adventurous tourists from faraway 
lands, might fish for trout, or hunt for deer or tahr along the way. 
From Mesopotamia, they might shiver and stumble their way 
across the rocky rapids of the Rangitata River into the country of 
Nowhere, made paradoxically famous by Samuel Butler’s 
Erewhon.14 
High above the lake on the true right, clings the University of 
Canterbury’s Mount John Observatory, visited by 14,000 per year 
(of whom ninety percent come from overseas).15  The observatory 
depends on the crystalline air that Tekapo’s Nowhere provides. 
The uninterrupted darkness was protected in 2012 by the Aoraki 
Mackenzie Dark Sky Preserve, the biggest starlight preserve in 
the world.16  The Christchurch and Canterbury Tourism chief 
executive officer said of the protection of unadulterated darkness 
– “I genuinely believe getting this status is going to drive a lot 
more interest by people . . . it is quite an important accolade to 
get.”17 
While appearing empty at first glance, the interplay of 
property and ecosystem services at Tekapo’s Nowhere contributes 
to the lives of New Zealanders and their guests in many ways. 
First, the sheep and deer farming provide basic needs of food and 
clothing. The broad expanses of deep-rooted tussock sequester 
 
 14. SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON (Dover Thrift ed. 2002) (1872). 
 15. Alan Wood, Starry Skies Boost for SI Tourism, THE PRESS, June 11, 2012, 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/business/7076945/Starry-skies-boost-for-SI-
tourism, archived at http://perma.cc/9MJR-KEV3. 
 16. Id.; Paul Gorman, Southern Skies Get Starlight Reserve Status, THE 
PRESS, June 10, 2012, http://www.stuff.co.nz/science/7075550/Southern-skies-
get-starlight-reserve-status, archived at http://perma.cc/L82H-BKH8. 
 17. Wood, supra note 15. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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carbon, stabilize soil, host nitrogen-fixing microbiota,18 and burn 
into the mind’s eye of New Zealanders homesick for the home turf 
on which they might never set foot.  In addition, the undammed 
braided rivers flowing into Lake Tekapo provide flood protection, 
native and sports-fish habitat, and clean water for drinking and 
teeth-chattering swimming. On the other hand, the dammed 
water flowing out of the lake generates electricity and irrigates 
pastures. Finally, the cliffs, ridges, nooks, and valleys provide 
recreation, leisure, and tourism opportunities that contribute to 
fitness and weight management, fill hunters’ freezers with lean 
meat, and remind us who we are when the twists, turns, and jolts 
of life make us forget. 
 Taylor’s Mistake B.
We finish at Taylor’s Mistake beach and the Godley Head 
Peninsula, a popular peri-urban coastal landscape on the 
outskirts of Christchurch, on the east coast of the South Island.  
With seventy-five percent of New Zealanders living within ten 
kilometers of the sea,19 Taylor’s is one of many such coastal 
nooks.  On the southeast edge of Christchurch, Taylor’s Mistake 
is a narrow cove sandwiched between the steep black bluffs of 
Scarborough Heads, the grassy slopes of the Godley Head 
Peninsula, and the sometimes sparkling but often-moody 
Southern Pacific Ocean. The northeast aspect of the beach and 
the topography of the sea bottom and surrounding cliffs make 
Taylor’s Christchurch the most popular surfing beach. The only 
large permanent structures in the valley are the public toilets 
and showers and the Taylor’s Mistake Surf Lifesaving Club, 
whose members patrol the beach on summer days and compete in 
city, regional, and national surf lifesaving competitions.  But for 
the ice cream truck playing a plinking version of “Greensleeves” 
between the parking lot and the beach on summer days, there are 
 
 18. See M.A. Line & M.W. Louitt, Studies on Non-symbiotic Nitrogen Fixation 
in New Zealand Tussock-grassland Soils, 16 N.Z. J. AGRIC. RES. 87 (1973). 
 19. Are New Zealanders Living Closer to the Coast?, STATISTICS N.Z., 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/Migration/internal-
migration/are-nzs-living-closer-to-coast.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/CF9G-HTQQ. 
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no cafes, shops, or vending machines in Taylor’s Mistake. Even 
cell phone coverage is spotty.20 
At the southeast corner of the beach lies the trailhead of the 
Godley Head walkway and mountain bike track that winds 
around the peninsula. Entire sections of the walkway fell into the 
sea in the 2011 earthquakes, leaving Boulder Bay in a cloud of 
dust, and a whole layer of cliff faces newly exposed to the winds 
and the waves. Following the quakes, the track was closed for 
nearly eighteen months. But so well loved is Godley Head that 
the closure was roundly ignored by walkers, runners, and 
mountain bikers.21  Transgressions to the closure were so 
frequent that the council staff repairing the track had no choice 
but to smile, wave, and comment on the weather to each and 
every transgressor, often more than once. 
The Anaconda mountain bike track climbs the hill almost 
immediately after the track leaves the beach, slicing through 
pasturage of grazing sheep. From the top of the peninsula, the 
track continues in view of the deep blue waters of Lyttelton 
Harbor and the Banks Peninsula beyond. The tip of Godley Head 
peninsula hosts a small sheep farming operation and World War 
II era gun emplacements dug into the hill to guard against the 
feared Japanese attack that never arrived. 
The track then loops down to the top of the cliffs hanging 
over the ocean.  Just over the lip of the newly exposed cliff, a 
predator-proof fence guards a colony of little blue penguins 
(Eudyptula minor). Before the quakes, visiting the penguins was 
a local highlight for adults and children alike. A bit further, a 
narrow track branches off and sidles down the hill to Boulder 
Bay, a small rocky cove with tidal pools and a small cluster of 
quaint and quirky one-room seaside cottages, or “baches” in the 
New Zealand vernacular. 
So seamless are the boundaries of ownership of ES provision 
at Taylor’s that the public track to Taylor’s from the west passes 
 
 20. Giles Brown, Splish, Splash Cools Hot Summer Day, THE PRESS, Dec. 31, 
2008, http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/our-communities/779034/Splish-
splash-cools-hot-summer-day, archived at http://perma.cc/NF72-JGBF. 
 21. Rachel Young, Quake-hit Port Hills Tracks Reopen, THE PRESS, Jan. 2, 
2013, http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/christchurch-earthquake-2011/8134 
920/Quake-hit-Port-Hills-tracks-reopen, archived at http://perma.cc/P3Z4-E7A3. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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directly through a bach. “Public Track” signs point up the bach 
stairs and across the veranda. Signs then lead up the neighbor’s 
stairs and in front of the next veranda. On sunny weekend days, 
an ever-present and ever-ebullient naked man on the veranda 
pleasantly greets walkers. Such is the offbeat charm of Taylor’s. 
As the emptiness of open spaces offers solace and center in the  
Tekapo high country, the idiosyncratic topography of Taylor’s 
Mistake offers the freedom to be naked on a sunny Saturday. 
 
 
Figure 1: The public/private interface at Taylor’s, minus the 
ever-ebullient naked man. 
 
The seemingly empty spaces at both ends of the Mountains to 
the Sea transect typify Wilson’s biophilia hypothesis,22 the innate 
feeling of coming home to a place one has never been. Indeed, a 
curiously important contribution that the unadulterated yet 
bounteous spaces like Tekapo and Taylor’s provide is shelter from 
the proverbial storms of urban life. In the weeks and months 
following the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, 
 
 22. See generally BIOPHILIA: THE HUMAN BOND WITH OTHER SPECIES (Edward O. 
Wilson & Steven R. Kellart eds., 1986). 
9
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Cantabrians who were able flocked not to cities, but to New 
Zealand’s vast places of emptiness and calm.23 
III. THE MAPPED EXPERIENCE: THE SPATIAL 
METHOD 
Another method for observing the untidiness between 
property lines and ES in a landscape is the burgeoning field of 
Geographic Information Science (GIS). GIS is more often seen in 
ecology and conservation biology journals than in law reviews. 
Our intent is not to undertake a formal GIS evaluation of ES and 
their values in the case study landscapes. Rather, we aim to 
convey how GIS would depict existing data sets of ecosystem 
services.  GIS offers many advantages: illustrations are readily 
available; it renders complex resources more measurable, and 
their values more estimable. Yet to measure and estimate values 
properly is exceedingly difficult, and the data collection 
requirements prohibitively expensive. Further, GIS is inherently 
spatial, which gives the wonderful capacity to depict the scale of 
aquifer recharge processes in the Tekapo basin, as an example. 
However, estimating the value of the aquifer recharge 
contribution of a particular legal parcel of land is as easy as 
holding water in bare hands. New Zealand holds a fantastic depth 
and breadth of spatial data about its territory, more than in other 
countries, but there are still important, and inherent, holes in the 
available data. 
The most readily available spatial data are of course the legal 
parcel boundaries, which have no relation to the scale of most 
ecosystem services. Spatializing an experience of a place like 
Tekapo or Taylor’s Mistake combines mundane data such as sales 
prices, with the seemingly esoteric such as soil microbes, with the 
rarefied such as threatened species habitat, with the other-
worldly such as subterranean minerals and caverns. Combining 
all of those is a bit of a puzzle. In this section, we make a start. 
 
 23. STATISTICS N.Z., USING CELLPHONE DATA TO MEASURE POPULATION 
MOVEMENTS 14 (2012) (“Low-populated regions close to Canterbury attracted the 
highest percentages of Christchurch cellphones after the 22 February quake”), 
available at http://www.stats.govt.nz/tools_and_services/earthquake-info-portal/ 
using-cellphone-data-report.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/25BV-SWL6. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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Figure 2 locates Tekapo and Taylor’s Mistake on the map of 
the South Island of New Zealand, Tekapo in the Southern Alps, 
and Taylor’s some 200 miles to the northeast, on the coastal 
fringe of Christchurch. Figure 3 depicts a number of readily 
accessible data sets on different ES in the Lake Tekapo region. As 
the legend indicates, the maps include a simple Google view, legal 
land boundaries, soil types, vegetative cover types, waterways 
and recreational trails, public and private lands, agricultural 
land uses, and representative land values. Figure 4 focuses more 
closely on the crossovers between land boundaries and public and 
private lands in Tekapo. Figure 5 repeats the same sequence of 
maps in Figure 2, this time for the simpler coastal landscape at 
Taylor’s Mistake. 
The maps in Figures 2 through 5 speak for themselves.  The 
GIS representations describe the two case study landscapes in 
the detached, objectified discourse of the cadaster.24  Analysis 
beyond the pictorial is postponed to Parts V and VI. 
 
 
Figure 2: Showing the two case examples for the Mountains to 
the Sea transect with the mountainous start at Lake Tekapo in 
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South Canterbury including mountains and foothills, and Taylor’s 





Figure 3: The figure depicts a number of readily accessible data 
sets on different ecosystem services in the Lake Tekapo region 
representing the mountains and foothills of the transect; a) 
simple Google map, encompassing the Mount John Observatory 
described in Part II; b) land property boundaries; c) a map of the 
dozen or so listed soil types (of about 275 observed in New 
Zealand); d) a map of vegetative land cover types (e.g. tussock 
grasslands, exotic pine) of about 100 observed in New Zealand; e) 
rivers, creeks, lakes, and recreational trails (the latter are bold 
lines); f) public & private land (the public land is shaded dark 
gray); g) agricultural land uses; and h) a representative sample of 
land property values. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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Figure 4: This figure illustrates the overlay of land boundaries 
and the distribution of public and private landholdings in the 
Lake Tekapo area. The map a) shows public and private lands, 
with public lands shaded in dark gray; b) indicates land property 
boundaries; c) is an overlay of map b) on map a); and d) is again a 
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Figure 5: The figure depicts a number of easily accessible data 
sets on different ecosystem services in the Taylor’s Mistake area 
as part of the coast and sea transect. Figure 5 shows a) a simple 
Google map; b) land property boundaries; c) soil types; d) 
vegetative land cover; e) agricultural land uses; f) public & 
private land (the public land is shaded in dark gray); g) rivers, 
creeks and lakes and recreational trails (the latter are bold lines); 
and h) a representative sample of land property values. 
IV. FROM THE OWNED TO THE SHARED 
EXPERIENCE: THE PROPERTY PLURALITY 
METHOD 
Part IV introduces a third method of examining the 
untidiness of property in ES that departs from the orthodox 
private model. Property plurality favors the shared experience of 
landscapes and ES, over the owned experience of property 
monism. While the methods used in Parts II and III examined ES 
more closely, plurality focuses on property. Property plurality is 
closer to the narrative of Part II than the spatial of Part III. The 
challenge is mapping this less than orthodox measurement of 
property, such that places like Tekapo and Taylor’s become 
propertied truths of their grounded reality. Part IV draws on 
multiple, overlapping sources: concepts of mapping property to 
place, the potential of property marginality to explain the truth of 
our relationships with land, and the simplistically appealing idea 
that property exists because it is performed. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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John Nagle observes “there is a special need . . . to recover 
the importance of places in environmental law.”25  The same 
holds true for property. Re-physicalizing property to place is to 
engage in “resistant re-mapping,”26 a process that recognizes that 
the lines of property do not obediently conform to the surveyor’s 
draft, and that concepts of ownership extend beyond narrow, 
supposedly settled, paradigms of private title. Instead of a 
conventional tale of possession and right, the landscapes of 
Tekapo and Taylor’s possess a narrative of inter-connected 
property plurality, a “persuasive” story27 commensurate with the 
rich array of ecosystem services that these two landscapes 
likewise yield. 
Property plurality is, by its nature a rejection, of property 
monism. It is a willingness to see the otherness of property, to 
imagine a diversity of property rights, claims, and uses sited to 
contextual place. As Andre van der Walt argues, “we cannot 
afford to see the hegemony of the normal, the everyday or the 
mass consensus as a norm; we have to leave room for otherness, 
for difference.”28 
We sense the Tekapo Nowhere as an intuitive, omnipresent 
silence of just nothing.  At the same time, the background white 
noise of property plurality is similarly just there in the landscapes 
that surround us. Property plurality describes the vast range of 
relationships people share with land, from exclusive individual 
dominion to shared collective use, and from enforceable alienable 
right to claims of entitlement based on vague notions of 
belonging.  It acknowledges the grounded truth that our coastal 
and mountain landscapes, amongst others, are intensely 
propertied places, terra populi,29 rather than the neat, yet 
 
 25. JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAWS ENVIRONMENT HOW THE LAW SHAPES THE 
PLACES WE LIVE 252 (2010). 
 26. See generally BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 224-26. 
 27. See generally CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION ESSAYS ON THE 
HISTORY, THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP  (Robert W. Gordon & Margaret 
Jane Radin eds., 1994). 
 28. A.J. van der Walt, Property and Marginality, in PROPERTY AND 
COMMUNITY 81, 104 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 29. NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY: URBAN LAND AND THE POLITICS 
OF PROPERTY 93 (Dave McBride ed., 2004) [hereinafter BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING]. 
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fundamentally empty cadasters of abstract, objectified lines, 
separating one freehold, or quasi-freehold,30 parcel from another. 
 The Mapping of Property Plurality A.
The truism that “context is everything”31 is not helpful for 
property. Rather the reverse is truer; the nature of modern 
property in land is profoundly abstract. Law students are taught 
that property concerns rights between persons about things.32  
The legacy of this lesson is an unswerving faith in property as a 
form-less bundle of stick rights “divorced from the specificities 
and bonds of place and community.”33  Abstraction means that 
property focuses on the lines that divide atomistic private parcels, 
rather than the land in between and across such lines. Joseph 
Sax recognizes this perspective as myopic; his aspiration is that 
in a future “economy of nature,” “[v]iewing land through [its] lens 
[will] reduc[e] the significance of property lines.”34  Mapping 
property plurality is to reject the rudimentary sketch of the 
orthodox ownership model, and to imagine in its place a collective 
“warp and woof”35 of property type that weaves a diverse and 
pluralistic fabric across landscapes. 
 
 30. In the New Zealand South Island, Crown pastoral tenure is equivalent to 
freehold title. The N.Z. Fish & Game Council v. Her Majesty’s Attorney-General 
in Respect of Comm’r of Crown Lands (2009) C.I.V. 2008-485-2020 (H.C.). See 
also Ann Brower & John Page, When the Law is Silent, Trespassers W…: Law 
and Power in Implied Property Rights 42 ENVTL. L. REP. 10242, 10252 (2012). 
 31. See Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and Geography, in 
LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 3, 3 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003). 
 32. See generally STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, 
WHY, AND WHAT WE OWN 94  (2011). 
 33. BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 53. 
 34. Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: 
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council the Economy of Nature, 
45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1445 (1992). Singer likewise sees a weakening of 
boundaries. JOSEPH W. SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 90 
(2000) (“The boundaries of property do not separate owners inexorably from 
others or entitle owners to consider their own interests alone.  What we do 
inside our borders affects those outside.”). 
 35. ALDO LEOPOLD, FOR THE HEALTH OF THE LAND: PREVIOUSLY UNPUBLISHED 
ESSAYS AND OTHER WRITINGS 168 (J. Baird Callicott & Eric T. Freyfogle eds., 
1999) (“Doesn’t conservation imply a certain interspersion of land-uses, a certain 
pepper-and-salt pattern in the warp and woof of the land-use fabric?”). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
4_BROWER FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
772 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
Legal geographer, Nicholas Blomley, is not unique in writing 
of property’s estrangement from place.36  However, his work is 
groundbreaking in its geographic imagery.37  Blomley identifies 
at the heart of property law is a conscious disembodiment from 
context, a liberal “project” commenced in the seventeenth century 
by common lawyer Edward Coke: 
[T]he Western legal project is underwritten by an organized 
forgetting of [the places and spaces of social life], given that 
spatial diversity may affect core principles such as the rule of law 
and legal rationality . . . . [The] English common law has been 
designed as a form of dis-embedding. The systemization of the 
English common law [by Coke] . . . entailed the attempt at the 
creation of a unitary legal map in which the diverse local 
knowledges of the law were immediately suspect. Increasingly, 
legal knowledge is imagined as disembodied, true to its own 
internal logic . . . . This was a very conscious project, designed to 
eradicate the plurality and radical decentralization of legal 
voices.38 
Blomley contests the truth of this project, and traces the 
“shared complicities”39 of real property and cartography40 that 
together erased context and diversity from the geography of 
place. While Coke was systematically homogenizing property in 
the late 17th century,41 Blomley identifies a simultaneous 
 
 36. See, e.g., Maggie Chien, Book Note, Lawscape: Property, Environment, 
Law by Nicole Graham, 48 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 719, (2010). 
 37. Blomley’s scholarship is described as “agenda-setting” in a 2014 review of 
legal geography. EXPANDING SPACES, supra note 7, at 5. 
 38. Nicholas Blomley, From ‘What?’ To ‘So What?’: Law and Geography in 
Retrospect, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 17, 25 (J. Holder & C. Harrison eds., 2002) 
[hereinafter Blomley, Retrospect]. 
 39. Sarah Whatmore, De/Re-Territorializing Possession: The Shifting Spaces 
of Property Rights, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 211, 211 (J. Holder & C. Harrison 
eds., 2002). 
 40. See generally BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 67-105. Blomley identifies 
transition in both land law and geography in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, personified by jurist Edward Coke and cartographer 
Christopher Saxton, who were “engaged in a representational project in which 
space, place, and law begin to be cast in an increasingly modern and ‘liberal’ 
fashion.” Id. at 63. 
 41. BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 80 (Coke’s “common law systemization” was 
not only an “interjurisdictional struggle between rival legal structures,” it 
signaled “a shift in the spatiality of legal knowledge . . . . [T]he legal world 
17
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“cartographic sea change” that caused a “profound change in 
social scale, from the world of the local community to the national 
and international spaces of mercantile capitalism and the nation-
state.”42 Their combined effect was to institutionalize a 
“displacement of the locus of social identity,”43 such that maps 
came to represent space as “an objectified and asocial entity to 
which the cartographer has special access”44 to a refined map of 
“space is emptied of the complexities and particularities that give 
it meaning on the ground.”45 
The sensuous and tactile nature of premodern mapping . . . gives 
way to a rational . . . presentation of space.  Space no longer 
appears to have a subjective quality, but increasingly appears as 
an objective and pre-given surface . . . . [This] modernist 
conception of space as something to be measured, contained, 
divided, manipulated, and – crucially – alienated.46 
Yet, as Blomley posits, modern maps fail to account for 
“striking evidence of other understandings of property . . . 
divergent, and sometimes oppositional understandings of 
property” that “can entail very different spatial representations 
and practices.”47  Blomley uses the modern global city to situate 
his theory. His objective is to “unsettle the city,”48 to disrupt the 
empty ownership model by showing that cities comprise 
distinctive communities with unique local practices and local 
knowledge.49  Blomley fleshed out his “unsettling” city map in 
2004, with a lengthy case study of the Downtown Eastside 
precinct in Vancouver, Canada. Blomley cites community claims 
to an abandoned department store, struggles against 
gentrification, and community ownership of a small neighborhood 
 
increasingly is presented as unitary and centralized, rather than as fragmented 
and localized.”). 
 42. Id. at 83. 
 43. Id. at 80. 
 44. Id. at 91. 
 45. BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING, supra note 29, at 68. 
 46. BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 91. 
 47. BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING, supra note 29, at 55. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Property law must be seen as a form of “local knowledge.” See BLOMLEY, 
supra note 13, at 56-57. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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park, as exemplars of how competing and unorthodox property 
can be mapped to specific place. Blomley concludes that “a closer 
examination of urban property reveals a greater diversity of 
possibilities than the map suggests . . . . The ownership model 
however, invites us to overlook or ignore these other estates,”50 
“to gloss over the plurality of ‘legitimate’ claims to, and interests 
in, land.”51 
In particular, the narrative of Woodwards, the disused ex-
department store, illustrates the limitations of the ownership 
model map. Arguing also that property is inherently contested, 
Blomley describes the fault lines between competing conceptions 
of property seen in conflicts over the store’s future. 
The unitary claim of the developer is challenged by the argument 
that the poor also have a legitimate property interest in, and 
claim to, the [Woodwards] site. This interest is a collective one – 
note the frequent invocation of ‘us’ – and also a clearly localized 
one (‘the community’). This property interest in Woodward’s, 
moreover, is not one of alienation or transfer. It cannot be 
monetarized but is, rather, predicated on use, occupation, 
domicile and inherent need . . . . The redevelopment of 
Woodward’s is bad, activists say, not simply because it displaces 
but because it appropriates and encloses. It turns a collective 
interest into an individualized one.52 
Woodwards demonstrates that collective claims to property 
are not represented, nor are they representable, on conventional 
maps.  They are only revealed by default, through unsatisfactory 
absences or gaps.53  This is unsurprising, given property’s 
negative relation54 with place which renders “localization and 
heterogeneity” invisible.55  It is also unsurprising, Blomley 
argues, because the primary purpose of cartography is to 
 
 50. BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING, supra note 29, at 22. 
 51. Id. at 18. 
 52. Nicholas K. Blomley, Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the 
Poor, 17 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUD. 311, 316 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 
 53. See BLOMLEY, supra note 13. 
 54. See Blomley, Retrospect, supra note 38, at 24-27. (“[T]he tendency of the 
law [is] to erase spatial specificity and local difference in the name of an ordered 
and apparently cohesive unity.”). 
 55. BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 79. 
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arbitrate, not record, determining not so much what is property, 
but what to count as property.56  For maps to become reflective of 
the truth of property, diverse property must be re-embedded into 
its fragmented locality. Blomley exhorts that maps of such 
multiple geographies should not be ignored. “In large part these 
maps have not been documented in critical scholarship. This is 
not because they are absent but because no one has looked for 
them.”57 
Paul Carter is one scholar who has “looked for them.” Carter 
questions why “our representations of the world become hard and 
dry?” 58  Like Blomley, Carter attributes blame to Enlightenment 
geography, noting that “the rectilinear grid imposed on the 
earth’s surface . . . ha[s] no connection to the lie of the land—and, 
in a sense, no interest in it.”59  As if describing the dramatic 
coastline at Godley Head, Carter asks why we accept without 
question the information such maps disclose. 
A description of the world is accounted most authoritative when 
it contains no trace of the knower. . . . Maps do this with their 
alluringly complete coastlines . . . . Nothing moves in these ideal 
representations. They are theaters from which the possibility of 
anything happening has been removed. . . . . How remarkably 
silent our graphic descriptions of the world are: no breaking surf 
is heard in them, no animated conversation, no reports of gunfire 
or anguished whale song.60 
Carter concludes that lines on maps are simply “narrow 
pencils of shadow, . . .dark mortar joining the parts of the world 
together.”61  Carter shifts the focus from what is seen to what is 
unseen, the equivalent of the Tekapo Nowhere, “the swarm of 
possibilities that had to be left out when this line was taken.”62 
 
 56. See, e.g., BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING, supra note 29, at 15, 97. 
 57. BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 54. 
 58. PAUL CARTER, DARK WRITING GEOGRAPHY, PERFORMANCE, DESIGN 8 (2009). 
 59. Id. at 80. 
 60. Id. at 5. 
 61. Id. at 1. 
 62. Id. Carter uses western desert paintings by Australian Aboriginal artists 
as a counter-example of contextual mapping. See, e.g., id. at 129. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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 The Marginality of Property  B.
The property plurality method is also dependent on an 
openness to the marginal or eclectic,63 the prolific array of 
practices, uses, norms, and claims that define people’s 
heterogeneous relationships with land beyond enforceable right. 
In particular, marginal property explains the social implications 
of different forms of ownerships, articulating their meanings in 
truthful, unadorned ways. 
Andre van der Walt argues that property’s “logic of 
centrality” blinds us to the importance of property’s margins.64 
This logic refers to a habitual acceptance by “lawyers, owners, 
and users of property . . . that property institutions naturally 
assume a central place in society and that property—as an 
organizing concept—similarly assumes a central role in law and 
legal theory.”65  The consequences of centrality are twofold: first, 
that intellectual habits about property become unreflective and 
narrow, and second, that this inhibits a “much-needed social and 
legal transformation.”66  The marginal perspective on property 
seeks to “unsettle the assumed ‘normality condition’ of liberal 
tradition.”67  While marginal rights may lack the imprimatur of 
formal legal standing, they do not lack property indicia. They are 
identifiable, enacted by diverse performances, and occasionally 
vindicated. They even possess a certain doctrinal logic. 
Marginality . . . requires paying more attention to facts and 
unique circumstances and relying less on abstract principles and 
doctrine. . . . [It] has its own logic in that it will tend to look for 
the paradox and the contradiction rather than for broad theory 
and grand narrative, for diversity rather than uniformity, for 
dissent rather than consensus, for conflict and chaos rather than 
 
 63. Marginal refers to the marginality thesis developed by A.J. van der Walt. 
See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 
(2010). ‘Eclecticism’ is a virtue according to Joseph Sax. See Joseph L. Sax, Do 
Communities Have Rights? The National Parks as Laboratories of New Ideas, 45 
U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 509 (1984). 
 64. A.J. van der Walt, supra note 28, at 81. 
 65. Id at 81-82. 
 66. Id. Van der Walt’s marginalized property holders are post-apartheid 
black South Africans in urban townships and rural areas. See id. at 97–102. 
 67. Id. at 83. 
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consent and order. In other words, it directs our attention to fault 
lines or historical breakdowns rather than concentrating on or 
searching for the golden thread of continuity.68 
Amnon Lehavi’s “local public commons” is an example of 
marginal property that erodes atomistic views of property and 
enhances cohesion.69  Local public commons are modest public 
lands (small parks, playgrounds, swimming pools) claimed and 
controlled by residents in close proximity to the resource.70  
Lehavi analyses the factors that make successful local public 
commons work, identifying a neighborhood intimacy that allows 
frequent users to become acquainted, and develop “a limited level 
of reciprocal norms of ‘contribution in return for use.’”71  
Importantly, access to and use of the local public commons is 
enforced by collective fiat. 
Thus a swimming pool in small-town Ophir, New Zealand, is 
owned by its community in the sense that local rules dictate who 
can access the pool, when, and on what conditions.72  Communal 
ownership arose when public liability insurance for ageing school 
pools became vexed, and the local council threatened to close it.  
Reverting to community ownership, with its attendant rosters of 
volunteer maintenance and supervision, meant that this local 
public commons could stay open as a valuable community 
resource.73  While its ambiguous property status means that it is 
hard to locate on the Ophir town map (there are oblique 
references to the pool, no specific directions) its presence is 
obvious through its popular use. 
 
 68. Id. at 100. 
 69. See Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a 
Better Future for Urban Communities, 36 URB. L. 1, 4 (2004). 
 70. Often, the local government hands control of the resource over to the 
informal “sub-constituency scale” group. Id. at 14. 
 71. Id. at 47. Davina Cooper ascribes similar factors in her analysis of “social 
commons.” See Davina Cooper, Opening up Ownership: Community Belonging, 
Belongings, and the Productive Life of Property, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 625, 649-
52 (2007). 
 72. For example, outsiders can only use the pool during certain hours and on 
payment of a gold New Zealand one dollar or two dollar coin. 
 73. Central Otago has the hottest summer temperatures in New Zealand. 
Malcolm McKinnon, Otago Region – Climate, Plants and Animals, TE ARA – 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF N.Z., http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/otago-region/page-3 (last 
updated July 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/7VGN-45L8. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
4_BROWER FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
778 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32 
 
The idea of “ownership through belonging” is another 
manifestation of property marginality.  Avitil Margalit’s study of 
the “social interest” of football fans concludes that the collective 
relationship fans enjoy with their club is proprietorial since 
“belonging also denotes a property relationship.”74  Davina 
Cooper likewise sees property in the membership of a school 
community, yet it is “a quite different understanding of property,” 
one that is “constitutive of community life.”75  Cooper compares 
the right to exclude, and its links to space as conventional 
property, with the norm of inclusion and space being formative of 
community. Cooper surmises that the school community only 
makes sense if “the black box of unofficial property interests” is 
opened up.76  Looking at property relationships through the crude 
lens of the freehold landowner not only “misses, but also 
misrecognizes, what is taking place [at the school].”77 
 Property as Performance C.
This theoretical discourse ends with performance theory, the 
proposition that property is a “relational effect, not a prior 
ground, that is brought into being by the very act of performance 
itself.”78  In other words, doing does not merely describe or 
represent property, but it enacts, such that property becomes a 
reality through its performance. Geographers use performance 
theory to constitute place. For example, Tim Cresswell argues 
that “places are never established.  They only operate through 
constant and reiterative practice.”79  Blomley says that where 
performance theory is applied to property, it challenges the 
 
 74. Avitil Margalit, You’ll Never Walk Alone: On Property, Community, and 
Football Fans, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRY IN LAW 217, 226 (2009). 
 75. Cooper, supra note 71, at 630, 642. 
 76. Id. at 659. 
 77. Id. at 659. Similarly, marginal property is discernible in historic contexts, 
the interest of commoners in the unenclosed lands of eighteenth century 
agrarian England was a “form of ownership without possession,” a bond that 
“created a sense of self: it told commoners who they were,” “one of a tribe.” 
JEANETTE M. NEESON, COMMONERS: COMMON RIGHT, ENCLOSURE AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN ENGLAND 1700-1820, at 180 (1993). 
 78. Nicholas Blomley, Performing Property: Making the World, 26 CAN. J. L. 
& JURISPRUDENCE 23, 32 (2013) [hereinafter Blomley, Performing Property]. 
 79. TIM CRESSWELL, PLACE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 70A (2d ed. 2004). 
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modalities of the ownership model that recognize only two critical 
moments in time, the initial creation of property, and any 
subsequent transfer of title. Instead, time is always important, as 
performance belongs in the constant acts of doing. Importantly, 
the constancy of performance over time also has a citational 
effect, one more or less successful act “cites other such 
performances and, in so doing, compels future similar 
performances.”80  Performance and precedent are no strangers to 
the common law of property; indeed a sufficiency of doing is 
emblematic of doctrines such as adverse possession. Nor is doing 
illogical, for as Oliver Wendell Homes observed, “‘[t]he life of the 
[common] law has not been logic: it has been experience.’”81  We 
posit performance as a method of examining the untidiness at the 
margin between property and ES. 
Performance is liberating because it escapes the black letter 
strictures of property.82  If private property is the more or less 
successful performance of mowing lawns, building fences, 
registering title, or paying rates,83 then community property is 
just as equally enacted by swimming in village pools, collecting 
gold coins as entry fees, or drawing up volunteer cleaning rosters.  
Performativity unfreezes the (often) arcane rules that limit our 
imagination of what is property in land. 
To imagine property plurality is to faithfully depict the “lived 
experience of property,”84 to start to explain the untidiness that is 
the interplay of property and ES. As Hanoch Dagan opines, if 
property were to start afresh with a blank slate, it would be 
extraordinary if it were conceived as a formless, context-free 
 
 80. Blomley, Performing Property, supra note 78, at 36 (By the same logic, 
“[c]itational failures, conversely, are less likely to have performative effect.”). 
 81. Robert Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting 
Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 347, 412 (1998) (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 
(1881)). 
 82. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 
YALE L.J.1 (2000) (An example of a closed list mentality is the doctrine of 
numerous clausus, a civilian doctrine adopted to eliminate custom from French 
property law. Some common lawyers argue it also applies to the common law). 
 83. See Blomley, Performing Property, supra note 78, at 37. 
 84. See DAGAN, supra note 12, at 72-74. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss3/4
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bundle of rights.85  To use another Dagan analogy, plurality is 
akin to “a complex piece of music with full orchestration”; its 
alternative is “looking only at a melody line [that] risks missing 
most of the performance.”86 
V. COMPARING AND COMBINING METHODS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE GROUNDED TRUTH 
OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES IN LANDSCAPES 
Thus far, this paper has explored three disparate ways of 
exploring the untidiness: the lyricism of narrative, the rational 
data sets of GIS, and the marginalized otherness of property 
plurality. Part V begins to draw all three together through the 
prism of three questions, to try to discern the “complex 
orchestration” amidst the din of many singular melody lines. 
 Property on Its Own:  Who Owns Interests in A.
Ecosystem Services on Public and Private Land? 
Broadly speaking, the vesting of ownership of ES is an 
arbitrary and indiscriminant consequence of where surveyed or 
natural boundary lines fall.  This question, though seemingly 
obvious, is an attempt to quantify the interplay between property 
and ES through the singular lens of ownership.  This question, 
and its answer, reveal the deficiencies of a monistic depiction of 
property, with the hope that the cumulative knowledge of the 
others will provide a more satisfactory account. 
In the case of private land, the who question is relatively 
straightforward. Jeremy Waldron describes this as the “single 
organizing idea - the idea that it is for a certain specific person to 
 
 85. Hanoch Dagan, Reimagining Takings Law, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 
39, 48 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010) (“I believe that 
property should be construed as it actually is in law and in life: a set of 
institutions, each constituted by a particular configuration of rights. More 
precisely: the meaning of property, the content of an owner’s entitlements, 
varies according to the categories of social settings in which it is situated, and 
according to the categories of resources subject to property rights.”). 
 86. DAGAN, supra note 12, at 72. 
25
4_BROWER FINAL_EDIT 10/2/2015  2:19 PM 
2015] A HYBRID METHOD OF MEASURING PLACE 781 
 
determine how a specified resource is to be used.”87  While private 
ownership is relatively uncontested,88 there is frequent 
misapprehension as to the ownership of non-private property. 
Traditionally, the most recognized typology is public and 
common. Michael Brill observes that common property provides 
for “community life,” a sociability with “people you know 
somewhat” versus “public property” that provides for “public life” 
and a sociability with a “diversity of strangers.”89  Common 
property owners hold use rights to common lands, their 
entitlement derived through membership of the relevant 
privileged community. By contrast, the who in public property is 
less certain. It might be the state, a state agency, or Carol Rose’s 
“unorganized” public at large.90 
At Tekapo, public owners include state agencies such as the 
Department of Conservation (DOC), the Crown through its 
residual interest in pastoral leases, and the New Zealand public 
at large in the creeks and lake foreshore. More vexing is the 
hybrid public/common ownership of corporate entities like the 
University of Canterbury’s dark sky observatory. At Taylor’s, the 
public interest is equally mixed, between owners as diverse as the 
Christchurch City Council, DOC, the Godley Head Heritage 
Trust, and the amorphous public at large with its statutory 
interest in beaches, surfing waves, and the coastal foreshore.91  
And at Taylor’s Mistake beach, the local surf life saving club is an 
obvious yet oblivious92 example of common ownership. 
Ownership yields an unsatisfactory account of how property 
and ES interact, the consequence of a long-standing institutional 
 
 87. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 60 (1988); see 
generally Jeremy Waldron, What is Private Property?, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
313 (1985). 
 88. Uncertainty lies on the fringes, for example government ownership of an 
office building may be the practical equivalent of private ownership. At Taylor’s, 
the private ownership of baches on public land is a paradox. 
 89. Michael Brill, Problems With Mistaking Community Life for Public Life, 
14(2) PLACES 48, 48, 50 (2002). Each is different in scale, density, and physical 
environment needed to be robust. See id. 
 90. See Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom and 
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 719-22 (1986). 
 91. Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, § 4 (N.Z.). 
 92. See Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and 
Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 132 (1998). 
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bias of private property. “Owning . . . natural capital is disfavored 
in our property law, built as it is on . . . converting wildlands to 
agriculture (and today to suburbia).”93  Moreover, “owning 
property . . . has not traditionally entitled the owner to a 
continued supply of ecosystem services.”94 
Seeking insight in the distinction between public and private 
ownership is similarly unfruitful. There is no “bright line”95 
between the polarities of private and public; the porous divide 
yields no discernible impact on the intrinsic randomness of the 
ownership of ecosystem services. As J.B. Ruhl observes, “the 
distinctions may be purely academic, [as no property] regime[] 
has performed so as to integrate natural capital and ecosystem 
service values into resource allocation decision making in any 
meaningful way.”96  Rather than informing, the ownership prism 
reinforces the orthodoxy that “the challenge is insurmountable     
. . . [,] the very nature of ecosystem services defies assigning 
property rights.”97  In other words, the monistic reduction of 
property only takes us as far as it goes.98  This leads to the 
question, will adding a spatial method of measurement yield a 
more truthful representation? 
 Combining Property and Spatial Methods: Does B.
Property Fit Within Accurate Spatial Representations 
of ES? 
While question one is the classic propertied measurement of 
a landscape, question two combines the spatial with the 
ownership model.  The answer to question two seems to depend 
on what type of service is provided by the ecosystem service (i.e. 
 
 93. J. B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services: The Nature of Valuing Nature, in 
CONSERVATION FOR A NEW GENERATION: REDEFINING NATURAL RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT 155, 164 (Richard Knight & Courtney White eds., 2009). 
 94. Id. 
 95. MARGARET JANE DAVIES, PROPERTY: MEANINGS, HISTORIES, THEORIES 11 
(2007). 
 96. Ruhl et al., supra note 3, at 101. 
 97. Id. at 95. 
 98. See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1691, 1709 (2012). 
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whether regulating, provisioning, or cultural under the 
Millennium Ecosystems Assessment classification). 
In the case of two of the regulating services mapped in Part 
III (soil type and vegetative cover), property lines carve up the 
landscape without any regard to the services that vegetation or 
soil provide, whether carbon sequestration, soil stabilization, or 
the hosting of nitrogen fixing microbiota. In the case of 
waterways (only relevant at Tekapo), creeks and lakes may fulfill 
traditional roles as ambulatory natural boundaries, long 
recognized by the common law through the doctrines of accretion 
and erosion, but they depict little else beyond demarcation. 
However, in the case of agricultural provisioning services, 
there is a marked and not surprising convergence between 
patterns of property and ES at both locations. Logically, private 
owners determine “how a specified resource is used”; in these 
cases dominant agricultural uses; sheep grazing, deer farming, 
viticulture, and so on. Agricultural services at Tekapo and 
Taylor’s neatly correspond to private property lines, perhaps 
because there is little tillage without title. 
In the case of cultural services, only recreational trails were 
mapped in our GIS exercise. What is depicted in both Figures 3 
and 5 is grossly under-representative of the number and scale of 
recreational trails in existence at both of these well-loved 
landscapes. At Tekapo, those few trails that are mapped are 
evenly distributed between public and private lands. The latter is 
surprising, even perplexing, given the “trespass rights” vigorously 
asserted by private landowners in New Zealand (including 
pastoral leaseholders), and the conversely weak convention that 
secures public access to the “back country.”99  At Taylor’s, the 
single trail captured by the cadaster is mapped to public land. 
Neither spatial analysis nor property lines capture the 
specialness of place. The cultural service, the lived experience so 
imaginatively depicted through narrative, is lost even when we 
combine two stock-standard methods of describing natural 
resources in landscapes. 
 
 99. ANN BROWER, WHO OWNS THE HIGH COUNTRY 39, 163 (2008); Ann Brower 
et al., The Cowboy, the Southern Man, and the Man from Snowy River: The 
Symbolic Politics of Property in Australia, the United States and New Zealand, 
21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 455, 478-79 (2009). 
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 Combining and Comparing Narrative, Spatial, and C.
Plurality Methods: What Do They Reveal About the 
Uneasy Interface Between Property and ES? 
Combining and comparing the three methods exposes at least 
five manifestations of the untidiness at the margin of property 
and ES. We first discuss the five, then ask what they mean for 
property and ES. 
First, the disparate spatial datasets of the GIS in Part III 
reveal the ambiguous status of modern public property.  At a 
practical level, this manifests in the inadequate representation of 
public recreational trails at Taylor’s.  Comparing narrative to 
spatial analysis reveals the obvious failure to reflect the many 
mountain bike and walking tracks loved so assiduously as to be 
well-used despite “closed” signs warning of the danger of being 
crushed by earthquake-induced rockfall. At another, more 
conceptual level, it reveals in the curious non-status of the 
Summit Road, and the one-room cottages on the coastal foreshore 
at Taylor’s, shown as a white res nullius that should otherwise be 
green in Figure 5, map F.100 Each map on its own yields an 
impoverished understanding of public property; however, 
combining them with narrative reveals a richer understanding of 
the truth on the ground. 
This poverty of singular method is both definitional and 
valorized.  We are confused about what constitutes public 
property, and if and when identified, we under-value and under-
represent its worth. 101  Each method on its own, with its 
ambiguities and lack of detail, also demonstrates the public 
estate’s implicit subsidiarity.102  Property and private property 
have become synonymous, such that public real property is an 
uncomfortable and at times unwelcome interloper.  Using only 
one method of measurement affirms the perception that all 
property is private. 
 
 100. Public roads are vested in the Christchurch City Council as the roads 
authority, while the beach and foreshore are “ownerless” forms of public 
property under the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (N.Z.). 
 101. See John Page, Towards an Understanding of Public Property, in MODERN 
STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW (Nicholas Hopkins ed., 7th ed. 2013). 
 102. See generally Brower et al., supra note 99. 
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Second, when contrasted to the flowery narratives of Tekapo 
and Taylor’s in Part II, both the spatial and the property analyses 
are detached and removed.  In this sense, the latter represent the 
more abstract half of a property dialectic; the former represents 
the contextual. Comparing methods reveals the dialectical 
tension; combining them resolves it. 
This resolution contrasts to a century of property abstraction. 
Wesley Hohfield’s early twentieth century analysis of property as 
rights between persons about things103 rendered the res 
incidental to the propertied relationship.104  Around the same 
time, real property became an anonymous Blackacre,105 a 
universalized space stripped of its particularity and defining 
features. 
Legal geographers and property lawyers struggle in how to 
ground property rights in place. John Lovett cites the Land 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (LRSA) as an innovative exemplar of 
a property regime that contextualizes a new property right,106 in 
that case to the whims (cultural and geographic) of the Scottish 
countryside. The LRSA overcomes an “imaginative paralysis . . . 
about what is possible in property law design.”107  On their own, 
the property maps (map B in Figures 3, 4 & 5 in Part III) tell 
little of place. As Paul Carter notes, they are the hard and dry 
lines of the expert; whose cartographic skills turn somewhere into 
anywhere. To interpret these maps, we need to recall the 
narrative constructed by our personal experiences of place. Only 
 
 103. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfield, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710 (1917); Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfield, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
 104. This analysis remains dominant, leading to the oft-cited observation that 
its logical corollary is illusion, that property is simply ‘thin air.’ See Kevin Gray, 
Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 252 (1991). 
 105. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, AGRARIANISM AND THE GOOD SOCIETY: LAND, CULTURE, 
CONFLICT, AND HOPE 110-11 (2007). 
 106. John Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) 
Act 2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 741 (2011) (describing the “responsible right of 
access” to private lands). 
 107. See id. at 742-43. Lovett cites extensive public education for both access 
takers and landowners as ways of overcoming law and economics analyses that 
deride contextual property as imposing unfeasibly high information processing 
costs. 
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then, in the mind’s eye, do these abstract images make greater 
sense. 
Third, comparing the spatial methods of Part III with the 
plurality method of Part IV illustrates Eric Freyfogle’s “tragedy of 
fragmentation.”108  Unlike Garret Hardin’s famous tragedy of the 
commons thesis, this propertied tragedy occurs when there is too 
much private property, when parceled private enclaves dominate 
landscapes in the absence of any overarching regulation or 
coordination. Unconnected, discrete private ownerships fragment 
landscapes, and as Figures 3-5 show, fragment the natural 
capital and resource flows of (especially) regulating ES.109 
Fourth, the plurality method underscores gaps in our 
understanding of the diversity of property. For example, the 
“green blob”110 of seemingly unilaterally public land at Taylor’s 
(Figure 5, map F) fails to show the nuanced diversity of different 
types of public ownership - the interests of the Godley Head 
Heritage Trust, the Christchurch City Council (with and without 
the private baches), and of DOC - all of whom have differing 
vested interests in the coastal landscape. These maps also ignore 
tenure arrangements other than the ubiquitous fee simple; the 
Crown pastoral leases at Tekapo, the grazing licenses on the 
Godley headland, or the dark sky preserves at Mount John 
Observatory. 
Fifth, (and not necessarily exhaustive of all the implications 
these maps pose for property), there is also the barest glimpse of 
yet another untidiness, the competing values of propriety and 
commodity in property.111  The sample land values shown as a 
separate data set (map H in Figures 3 and 5) contrasts to the 
propriety of property, or its capacity to enable well-lived lives in 
flourishing communities. Propriety is the immeasurable and 
elusive quality of property; to record it is, as noted earlier, like 
 
 108. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
COMMON GOOD 230, 265 (2003). 
 109. Ruhl et al, supra note 3, at 102 (noting the poorly defined scope of private 
property rights is analogously referred to in ES literature as a “Tragedy of 
Ecosystem Services”). 
 110. Richard H. Cowart & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial 
Theory and Administrative Reality, 15(3) ECOLOGY L.Q. 375, 410 (1988). 
 111. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING 
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970 (1997). 
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holding water in your bare hands. At Tekapo and Taylor’s, it is 
the ways nature’s bounty in the vast spaces at either end of the 
transect, enhance human flourishing. 
VI. MOVING FROM THE OWNED TO THE SHARED 
IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE LIVED 
The goal of any method of measuring property in ES should 
be one where the full orchestration of Tekapo and Taylor’s is 
audible, a diverse property paradigm where quirky baches, 
conservation lands, private freehold, dark sky preserves, historic 
reserves, Crown pastoral leases, and the eclectic rest collectively 
give us a better sense of place. Writing in 1992, Joseph Sax 
presciently describes an “ecosystemic” vision of property that 
approximates this goal, a conceptualization where the “natural 
services” that land provides has value.112  He states: 
An ecological view of property, the economy of nature, is 
fundamentally different. Land is not a passive entity waiting to 
be transformed by its owner. Nor is the world comprised of 
distinct tracts of land, separate pieces independent of each other. 
Rather an ecological perspective views land as consisting of 
systems defined by their function, not by man-made boundaries. 
Land is already at work, performing important services in its 
unaltered state. For example, forests regulate the global climate, 
marshes sustain marine fisheries, and prairie grass holds the soil 
in place.113 
Sax’s ecosystemic model is one where connections dominate, 
land is in service, use rights are determined by physical nature, 
landowners take on a custodial role, the line between public and 
private is blurred, and there is less focus on individual 
dominion.114  Sax’s blurring of property lines “recognizes that 
most land in the real world is owned in hybrid configurations of 
rights.”115  Yet despite its flaws and non-alignment with the real 
 
 112. Sax, supra note 34, at 1451. Sax’s 1992 article on the Lucas case pre-
dated Daily’s seminal work NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON 
NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS by some five years. 
 113. Id. at 1442. 
 114. Id.at 1445-46, 1451. 
 115. Ruhl et al., supra note 3, at 100. 
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world, the private ownership model remains stubbornly 
paramount.  We suggest that a full orchestration is more likely 
when the three methods are combined.  The combination yields a 
grounded truth of the natural resources of landscape, which the 
others on their own do not. 
Let us consider carbon sequestration as an example. As a 
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, New Zealand has an Emissions 
Trading Scheme in force. If a landowner in Tekapo plants a pine 
plantation, she owns and can trade the carbon credits. We can 
map that ownership of carbon with the spatial method. By 
contrast, the lived experience is of the ES— carbon 
sequestration—not of the carbon credit itself. The ES is in the 
shared air, not on the owned ground.116  As such, carbon 
sequestration is a public good from which no one can be excluded, 
while the carbon credit is a private good.117  A combination of the 
narrative, spatial, and plurality methods takes us closer to 
understanding the lived experience of the public good nature of 
the ES than any of the three methods on their own. 
Combining the three methods also reveals a curious irony.  
The more rational and detached the method, the more singular 
are the melodies and the less recognizable are the landscapes.  
The lyrical force of narrative is persuasive in its account of place, 
and the ways in which ecosystem services enhance our well-being. 
At the other end of the spectrum, GIS is utilitarian in its 
identification of the readily accessible data sets we set out to 
record. 
Further, rational and detached though it may appear, 
cartography is not value-free. Its images are selective in “their 
content and . . . their signs and styles of representation,”118 and 
reliant on the cartographer-expert to explain to the layperson the 
“lie of the land.”119  As Boaventura Santos explains, “to be 
practical a map cannot coincide point by point with reality.”120  
This distortion of reality is however not a distortion of truth, 
 
 116. See generally THEODORE STEINBERG, SLIDE MOUNTAIN, OR: THE FOLLY OF 
OWNING NATURE (2000). 
 117. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 13, 14 (1965). 
 118. BLOMLEY, supra note 13, at 83. 
 119. CARTER, supra note 58, at 80. 
 120. Santos, supra note 10, at 282. 
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provided “the mechanisms by which the distortion of reality is 
accomplished are known and can be controlled.”121  Such 
mechanisms include scale, projection, and symbolization. Scale is 
“the ratio of distance on the map to the corresponding distance on 
the ground,”122 projection transforms “the curved surfaces of the 
earth . . . into planes,”123 while symbols graphically represent 
“selected features and details of reality,”124 such as rivers or 
cities. 
These factors—historic and normative—permeate the raw 
objectivity of GIS. Yet, in the end, despite distortion and bias, we 
do not criticize the mapping of ecosystem services. Maps of basic 
regulating and provisioning services depicted in Part III do “bring 
data together in a single perceptible space,” in the process 
“yield[ing] unexpected new information”125 and revealing 
connections. As Carol Rose observes, “the map, far from stifling 
the imagination, invites the viewer to reflect on the story behind 
the case.”126  And in making that invitation, personalized 
recollections of place, the stuff of narrative, complete the picture. 
Maps of property likewise distort reality, using the same 
contrivances of scale, projection and symbolization to make a 
version of propertied place fit the page.  However, the 
malformation of property goes further, a perversion of not only its 
reality but also its truth. The singular focus on property lines 
conceals diverse tenures and ownerships. More broadly, it fails to 
account for the truth of our many and varied relationships with 
land. The simple, easily understood representations depicted on 
maps of property are crude lines of demarcation, not signifiers of 
the true lie of the land. 
Maps of property reveal profound insights into the hegemonic 
private ownership model. The vision we get from the singular 
method is narrow and unrepresentative, and cannot understand 
the lived and shared experience of ES.  The curious irony is that 
property’s otherness is revealed by default, in the gaps, or swarm 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 283. 
 123. Id. at 284. 
 124. Id. at 285. 
 125. ROSE, supra note 27, at 277. 
 126. Id. 
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of possibilities that fail to be recorded. In this way, maps do not 
show gaps in maps, but gaps in property. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented three methods of experiencing 
property and ES, which range from the detached quantitative to 
the lyrical qualitative.  The spatial analysis of GIS is commonly 
seen as the most objective and reliable; the plurality method is 
the most avant-garde and post-modern; and the narrative method 
is the most quirky and least replicable.  By itself, none of the 
three arrives at accurately representing the interplay between 
property and ES. This is because the lived experience of 
ecosystem services involves sharing not owning. 
Yet comparing methods reveals a curious irony—the more 
detached and objective the method, the less recognizable the 
landscape.  In other words, the more reliable the method, the less 
representative its results. 
In combining the three methods, we suggest a new hybrid 
method of interpreting property and ES.  The prism of the 
empirics of the two ends of the Mountains to the Sea transect 
suggests that attempts to examine the “relationship” between 
property and ES are misguided.  Though the interplay and 
overplay between the two are tense and untidy, property and ES 
are the same—two methods to quantify, commodify, and corral 
nature. Monisitic property hides the fact that property and ES 
are one and the same because it attempts to own nature’s bounty 
not share it. 
The difficulty of re-uniting two sides of the same coin 
suggests that one side is misshapen.  In its current, non-
pluralistic, form, property is a poor fit for ES, both spatially and 
narratively because it focuses on owning not sharing. Adding 
pluralistic property to the spatial and narrative methods gives a 
more multi-dimensional form of property, allowing the multi-
scalar ES to co-exist. To recognize the symbiosis between 
property and ES is also to recognize that the lived experience of 
ES is shared. This recognition, and the hybrid method that bells 
the cat, has many applications, from dark sky preserves to 
reconciling ancient native title claims with the hyper-modern 
world. 
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